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KALYANI ROBBINS*
Framers' Intent and Military Power:
Has Supreme Court Deference to
the Military Gone Too Far?
The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undis-
ciplined valor of all other nations, and rendered her the mistress
of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the
final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of
Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions,
been the price of her military establishments. A standing force,
therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a nec-
essary, provision. On the smaller scale, it has its inconve-
niences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal.
On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and pre-
caution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations;
and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource
which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its pru-
dence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of
resorting to one, which may be inauspicious to its liberties.'
T he goal of this Article is to bring back this level of caution
and concern which has been gradually eroded by the great
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1995. Associate, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, California.
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California. Law Clerk to the Honorable Norman H. Stahl, United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, Boston, Massachusetts, 2000-2001. Law Clerk to the
Honorable Faith S. Hochberg, United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, Newark, New Jersey, 2001-2002. I wish to thank Stanford Law School Dean
Kathleen M. Sullivan for her generous contribution of time spent mentoring me
throughout this project-without her guidance, encouragement, and comments on
several drafts, this Article would not have been possible. I also wish to thank Stan-
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deference the Supreme Court has granted the military in balanc-
ing the rights of citizens with asserted military expediency. As
the United States continues to grow as a nation and a world
power, we must take care not to lose sight of the principles upon
which this country was founded, and which have been the basis
for its success. While we protect ourselves and our allies through
the indispensable aid of our military, and this inevitably entails
some individual sacrifice, we must nonetheless insist that the mil-
itary keep its need to infringe upon our liberties to a minimum.
The first ten amendments to the United States Constitution,
ratified in 1791 and known as the Bill of Rights, create the core
of what people today consider their most basic freedoms. With-
out these rights, and consistent judicial adherence to them, most
Americans would not feel secure. There are two major sources
of danger to these basic rights: internal and external. Internally,
we must protect ourselves from our own infringement of these
rights through the firm restrictions that the Constitution places
on the government in its treatment of the people. Externally, we
must protect our system of maintaining these freedoms from for-
eign parties who may wish to take over and change our govern-
ment. Both safeguards are extremely important, but either is
worthless without the other. In other words, these goals are en-
tirely dependant on one another. When we spend our resources
on the national defense, we must ask ourselves just what it is that
we are protecting. At the same time, we must also accept that
occasionally it will be necessary to ask that individuals make per-
sonal sacrifices in order to protect the entire set of freedoms for
the whole.
It is the role of the Supreme Court to balance these interests
and determine the extent to which the military may limit certain
liberties in order to protect the nation. More specifically, it is the
Court's duty to limit the military's unconstitutional acts to those
in which it simply must engage. Certainly no one would argue
that the military should be completely unbound by the Constitu-
tion. The disputed issue merely goes to how it is to be kept in
check, by whom, and to what extent. In Part I of this Article, I
will discuss the Court's practice of deferring to the military's
judgment regarding this balance, which prevents it from being
properly struck.
The Framers clearly thought about this balance when author-
ing the Bill of Rights. Indeed, while the focus of these amend-
[Vol. 78, 1999]
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ments was on individual freedoms, the need for urgent
exceptions for the military was addressed where necessary. The
ultimate question this Article seeks to address is to what extent
the Framers intended the Court to bend the rules for the military
above and beyond the leeway already provided. I will investigate
this in Part II through a combination of textual, historical, and
structural analysis. This investigation and analysis will demon-
strate that the Court has granted the military a degree of power
well beyond that contemplated by the Framers.
This analysis is important because original intent has not been
taken into consideration sufficiently with regard to the level of
autonomy the military is allowed. There have been many argu-
ments based on policy, necessity, and even justiciability, but it
seems that judges and scholars have forgotten about the Framers
altogether. If we are to continue to live in a government that
they structured, there must be some limitation on the extent to
which we deviate from their carefully thought-out plan. Every
word in the Constitution had a purpose, and in other areas of
inquiry we treat that as an important factor to this day. This Ar-
ticle could include many long sections on modern issues and ad-
visable policy, and it does marginally address these issues, but its
focus is on the Framers, the way they structured our government,
and their placement of the military within that scheme.
One of the sources of the Court's inability to conduct proper
constitutional analysis in military cases is its lack of access to
complete and unbiased information upon which to base that
analysis. In Part III, I will make an effort to suggest methods for
addressing this problem alternative to simply letting the military
use its special knowledge as a source of power over the Court.
Part IV will demonstrate a modern example of where the prob-
lem of excessive deference can lead, and present the Court with a
suggestion to use this as a context for change. Finally, the Article
will conclude by summarizing the need for change and urging the
Court to reconsider its policy of deference.
I
THE SUPREME COURT'S TRADITION OF EXCESSIVE
DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY
When dealing with those cases in which individuals assert that
the military has violated their constitutional rights, the Supreme
Court has regularly and almost exclusively held in favor of the
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military. This is the case regardless of what right is involved, or
of what military interest is at stake. The Court claims to look to
the importance of the interests at stake,2 but the actual analysis is
no stricter than a typical non-military rational basis inquiry.3
Why give such blind deference? If the military's interests are so
important, why not let them be held to a brighter light so that
they can prove their justification? To do so would lend greater
credibility to, and provide stronger justification for, the military's
true needs, while screening out those abridgements of individual
rights that it does not need to make. This Part will examine some
of the Supreme Court precedent concerning military deference
and will discuss the need to reconsider this methodology.
Although Korematsu v. United States4 has never been over-
ruled, it has been met with heavy criticism. For many, it repre-
sents the Court's deference to the military at its blindest and
most dangerous moment. While the more recent and subtle
cases may be the ones that should raise greater concern, Kore-
matsu is still the paradigmatic case of military deference. In that
case, Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-American man, was convicted
of violating an order requiring all people of Japanese ancestry to
report to detention camps. In appealing that conviction, he chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the order. The Court upheld the
conviction by a vote of 6 to 3, despite purporting to apply strict
scrutiny. Justice Black's opinion began:
[AIll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restric-
2 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (granting the military
its usual deference when considering the "relative importance of a particular mili-
tary interest").
3 See id. at 512 (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing the military interest at stake
in that case as "legitimate" and "rational," and therefore sufficient); see also
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (rejecting a Due Process challenge to the
male-only draft registration requirement on the basis of the male-only combat re-
quirement, without analyzing the constitutionality of the latter); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (upholding against First Amendment challenge the application
of a regulation allowing a military commander to suppress speech that "he perceives
to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under
his command," without any actual analysis of whether such a danger existed in that
case); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (accepting the military's as-
sertion of necessity without engaging in additional analysis of the circumstances).
4 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
[Vol. 78, 1999]
Framers' Intent and Military Power
tions; racial antagonism never can.5
Nevertheless, the Court did not follow its own prescription to
carefully scrutinize the true purposes of the order, which could
have been motivated by racial animus. Even assuming that the
order was issued in good faith, the Court still did not make an
effort to assess whether it was indeed necessary.
The Court offered as justification for upholding the order that
"military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of
defending our shores, concluded that curfew provided inade-
quate protection and ordered exclusion."6 This reasoning does
not address the issue of the military's relationship to constitu-
tional analysis, which is implicated by such a severe case: should
the Court accept the military's assertions of necessity without
further analysis, or should it use a more standard means/end
analysis? And, assuming the former, as the Court seems to have
done, how should the military then be kept in constitutional
check if there is no entity genuinely analyzing the constitutional-
ity of its actions?
It was in Korematsu that the Court set the stage for its perpet-
ual deference to military authority:
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hard-
ships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the
impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its
responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the
burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large
groups of citizens from their homes, except under circum-
stances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of
modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces,
the power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger.7
This rhetoric attempts to make the Court's conclusions psycho-
logically palatable, but does nothing more than say that some-
times it is necessary to sacrifice the needs and rights of an
individual in order to protect the state. This point, however, is
the basic backdrop of all rights-based constitutional analysis, or
the Court would never engage in it at all. If this were not the
case, the Court would just automatically strike down every
abridgement of individual rights without further inquiry. Implicit
5 Id. at 216.
6 Id. at 218.
7 Id. at 219-20.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
even in those cases which do invalidate a law as unconstitutional
is that had the law been justifiable as the only way to protect a
strong government interest, it would have survived the inquiry.
The Court has consistently used a reminder of this backdrop in
lieu of real constitutional analysis in military cases, suggesting
that the inquiry itself had been done at the military level. This
allocation of power does not do justice to the Constitution, how-
ever, as the military is in no position to interpret the Constitution
in this context, nor was it ever intended that it should do so. In-
deed, the level of deference the Court has granted to the military
for the interpretation of the extent of certain constitutional pro-
visions may amount to a violation of the separation of powers.
The Court has a duty to enter into some degree of constitutional
analysis itself.
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Korematsu, described with great
foresight the frightening implications of the decision in that case:
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will
sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the
promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however
unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military
emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander
may revoke it all. But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such
an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or
rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitu-
tion sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has vali-
dated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The princi-
ple then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more
deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new
purposes.8
Although the military has not attempted to use this case to again
racially discriminate in criminal procedure or to transplant citi-
zens, and the Court has not cited to it when justifying its defer-
ence to the military in modern contexts, Justice Jackson's fears
have been realized through a pattern of analysis much like that of
Korematsu.
Since Korematsu, the Court has continued to accept the mili-
tary's assertions of expedience. As Justice Jackson points out,
however, "even if they were permissible military procedures, I
deny that it follows that they are constitutional. If, as the Court
8 Id. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 78, 19991
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holds, it does follow, then we may as well say that any military
order will be constitutional and have done with it."9 This is es-
sentially what the Court must do in military cases where it does
not have sufficient information before it to determine the neces-
sity of the action at issue. This poses a very serious problem for
conducting any sort of traditional constitutional analysis, and
something must be done to rectify it. So far, the Court has
neither made an effort to develop a method for accurately inves-
tigating necessity, nor has it been in the practice of finding a
nexus between the asserted necessity and the means employed
before upholding them.
One of the more recent examples of this is Goldman v. Wein-
berger."° In that case, the Court upheld the application of a mili-
tary regulation involving uniformity of dress to a rabbi
serviceman, forbidding him to wear a yarmulke when in uniform
despite the fact that it was usually hidden by his service cap."
The government's interest could not fairly be found compelling,
as evidenced by the fact that Dr. Goldman had worn the yar-
mulke for years before it was even noticed. Moreover, there was
insufficient evidence that the interest was compelling in the ag-
gregate, as the only evidence of the need for complete uniformity
of appearance was the military's own assertion of that need. The
regulation was overinclusive and not narrowly tailored, as it only
allowed for completely invisible religious apparel, and even that
only at the (standardless) discretion of the commanders. 2 Still,
the Court upheld the regulation and its application to Dr.
Goldman, relying exclusively on the "considered professional
judgment of the Air Force."' 3 In doing so, it all but stated that
the First Amendment does not exist in the military: "Our review
of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds
is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws
or regulations designed for civilian society."14 While it may be
true that some of the benefits society derives from the First
Amendment are not applicable to military settings, such as en-
9 Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
10 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
11 See id.
12 See id. at 509 ("[M]ilitary commanders may in their discretion permit visible
religious headgear and other such apparel in designated living quarters and
nonvisible items generally." (emphasis added)).
13 Id. at 508.
14 Id. at 507.
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couraging robust debate and promoting democracy, the Amend-
ment contemplates certain individual rights as well, and the
military is comprised of individuals.
A few years earlier, in another landmark case of military def-
erence, Chappell v. Wallace," several enlisted men brought a suit
against their superior officers for race discrimination, and the
Court held that the doctrines that would apply in a civilian con-
text did not apply to this case because of the special circum-
stances surrounding military governance.' 6 The Court called
allegations "that because of [respondent servicemembers'] mi-
nority race petitioners failed to assign them desirable duties,
threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and
imposed penalties of unusual severity"' 7 a "nonreviewable mili-
tary decision[ ]."18 The Court held that such cases should be kept
within the internal administrative grievance process, subject to
judicial review only through the Court of Military Appeals.' 9
The Court went so far as to state that "[t]he special status of the
military has required, the Constitution contemplated, Congress
has created and this Court has long recognized two systems of
justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one for mili-
tary personnel."2 This is at best a circular argument, in that it
rests justification for the military's judicial power on the fact that
it exists.
When the Court found that "the Constitution contemplated" a
military judiciary, it did not rely on language anywhere in the
legislative document setting up the military judiciary, for there is
none. The Court found support for its notion that the Framers
envisioned "plenary" legislative control over the rights of ser-
vicemembers, including the option of giving constitutional ques-
tion jurisdiction to military judges, in Article I, Section 8, Clauses
12-14, which grant Congress the authority "To raise and support
Armies"; "To provide and maintain a Navy"; and "To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces."'" This assertion is certainly fodder for legal realists, as
there have been few occasions on which such a leap of imagina-
15 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
16 Id. at 304.
17 Id. at 297 (emphases added).
18 Id. at 298.
19 See id. at 302-03.
20 Id. at 303-04 (emphasis added).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
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tion as this was necessary to interpret a text. Would it then fol-
low that the power "To establish Post Offices"22 includes the
power to redefine the application of constitutional rights to pos-
tal workers? There is nothing at all in the Constitution itself, nor
the records of the convention, to suggest that at the will of Con-
gress, the military need not be subject to constitutional
requirements.
Over the years the Court's deference to the military has been
the basis for numerous rejections of challenges to military action
or other government action involving the military. Asserting this
deference, the Supreme Court has: allowed Congress to delegate
the authority to define the factors leading to the death penalty in
military capital cases to the President;23 allowed Congress to re-
quire only males to register for the draft;24 diminished the consti-
tutional rights of criminal defendants in cases before military
tribunals;25 allowed the Air Force to require its members to ob-
tain approval before circulating petitions;26 limited the free exer-
cise of religion to allow Congress to determine whether and
when to accommodate those who invoke that clause of the First
Amendment;27 and allowed the government to ban political
speeches and the distribution of leaflets on military reserva-
tions,28 to list but a handful of the cases. It is highly unlikely that
any of these regulations would have survived scrutiny in a civilian
context.
A common justification for the Court's deference to the mili-
tary is the necessity which comes from the Court's lack of exper-
tise. This is frequently mentioned in cases of deference, and is
also the apparent basis for those cases, to be discussed in Part II,
that call military decisions non-justiciable political questions.29
This, however, avoids what amounts to a practical problem by
applying a theoretical, rather than a practical, solution. Rather
than consider the practical alternatives to the Court's dearth of
22 Id. at § 8, cl. 7.
23 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996).
24 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981).
25 See Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1921).
26 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357-58 (1980).
27 See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
28 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
29 See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (appropriateness of National
Guard's training and orders non-justiciable); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83
(1953) (challenge to assignment of duties non-justiciable).
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information regarding military culture and strategy, the Court
has developed doctrine to obviate that need.
II
FRAMERS' INTENT, As EVIDENCED BY TEXT,
HISTORY, AND STRUCTURE
The goal of this Part is to find an answer to the central ques-
tion of this article: how much deference, if any, did the Framers
expect the Court to grant the military in cases involving constitu-
tional rights? The Framers took great care in selecting the lan-
guage they used in every clause throughout the Constitution and
its first set of amendments. Indeed, they engaged in numerous
and lengthy discussions, often over the inclusion of a single word
or two. In addition to carefully wording the text to make proper
interpretation more feasible, the Framers carefully considered
the array of issues that might be impacted by the substance of
that text. By looking at the text itself, the Framers' discussions
while drafting it, and the events from that time of which they
were doubtless cognizant, as well as some of their own comments
and clues with regard to interpretive method, a better under-
standing of what the Framers intended may be gained. It also
makes sense to take into account the structural integrity of the
document as a whole. It is important to remember that the Con-
stitution is a single document, and that all of its provisions must
work together.
This Part utilizes these methods of constitutional analysis in
order to uncover the role that the military, and its interests,
should play in our constitutional system according to the Fram-
ers' own design. First, this Article will provide a careful textual
analysis, bringing together various clauses in the Constitution
and its amendments, as well as discussions surrounding its draft-
ing, to demonstrate that significantly more attention was given
this issue than existing scholarship/case-law would suggest. Sec-
ond, I will survey and analyze the Framers' attitudes toward, and
concerns regarding, the military and its power vis-a-vis the civil
government. Third, I will make a structural argument, based pri-
marily on the doctrines of separation of powers and the non-jus-
ticiable political question, that supports my central thesis.
A. Analysis of the Text
The Framers did not explicitly draft a clause to guide the Court
[Vol. 78, 1999]
Framers' Intent and Military Power
in its application of constitutional principles to military situa-
tions. Perhaps they deemed this unnecessary because the mili-
tary was to be controlled by the civilian government, and
therefore the entire Constitution clearly applied to it. However,
where they did wish to limit rights in order to accommodate mili-
tary necessity, they did so explicitly, which suggests that we go
too far by exempting the military from the enforcement of other
rights not so limited. The Framers certainly did not, at any point
in the Constitution or in other records, set up the military as its
own legal society, separated from our constitutional structure.
Neither did they overlook the military entirely, leaving its con-
cerns to be addressed by future generations. Rather, the Framers
spoke often and with great insight about the military's needs and
excesses, and affirmatively addressed them at several points in
the Constitution. This portion of the Article will analyze the
Constitutional text that speaks to the question of deference to
the military, utilizing the same time-honored interpretive maxims
that the Framers used themselves.
1. The Doctrine of Inclusio Unius est Exclusio Alterius
Applies
If we apply the doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to
the Constitution's treatment of the military, we find that while
military exemptions from the strict adherence to certain require-
ments of the Bill of Rights were included, others were just as
consciously excluded. If there were serious doubt that the doc-
trine should apply to such a unique document as the Constitu-
tion, and we were to treat the area of military adherence to the
Bill of Rights as though it had not been addressed, perhaps it
would make sense to establish common law doctrine on the mat-
ter. However, the Framers did contemplate that the inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius doctrine would apply to the Bill of
Rights, and authored it based on that understanding. For this
reason, it behooves the Court to follow the letter and spirit of the
resulting document and not to establish common law doctrine
that conflicts with its purpose.
Those who were opposed to the idea of adding a bill of rights
to the Constitution were concerned about the difficulty of think-
ing up every worthwhile liberty, and feared that any bill of rights
would necessarily be incomplete, which would be dangerous to
OREGON LAW REVIEW
those rights left unenumerated. In the 1789 House debates on
this issue, Mr. Jackson said:
There is a maxim in law, and it will apply to bills of rights, that
when you enumerate exceptions, the exceptions operate to the
exclusion of all circumstances that are omitted; consequently,
unless you except every right from the grant of power, those
omitted are inferred to be resigned to the discretion of the
Government. 3
0
This concern was primarily expressed by opponents of the
amendments, but even those who supported them did not refute
the argument. Indeed, no effort was made to allay these fears, as
they were based on the most basic of all interpretive traditions.
Instead, great weight was granted to this concern by addressing it
with its own amendment. The Ninth Amendment 3' was written
to prevent the application of this maxim to individual rights, and
it thereby lends powerful credibility to the notion that the maxim
does apply to the rest of the document.32 Madison drafted the
amendment, and explicitly stated this purpose:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be as-
signed into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible argu-
ments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill
of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by
turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution [the Ninth
Amendment].33
Because the Bill of Rights is a finite set of exceptions to the
powers the Constitution grants to the government,34 the function
of this interpretive tradition would be to prevent the people from
asserting rights that the Framers had forgotten to include. This
30 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 442 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
31 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
32 Interestingly, this argument is itself an application of that doctrine. Because the
Framers included one exception to the maxim itself (for unenumerated rights), it is
unlikely that they envisioned other exceptions to it, or they would have written a
broader catch-all here (such as one simply stating that the maxim does not apply to
the Constitution).
33 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439.
34 For example, the power to try alleged criminals does not include the power to
make them testify against themselves, but absent the Fifth Amendment it would.
[Vol. 78, 19991
Framers' Intent and Military Power
same maxim, that could so easily have been applied to individual
rights without the Ninth Amendment, certainly must apply to
other categories of exceptions specifically included in the Consti-
tution and its amendments. It makes particular sense that it
would apply to those exceptions that were created on behalf of
the feared government and against the rights otherwise funda-
mentally belonging to the people.
The Framers, while clearly demonstrating their awareness of
this interpretive maxim, chose to write explicit exceptions for the
military to certain enumerated rights, but not to others. Implicit
in such an exception is that without it, the military would be re-
quired to protect that privilege, just like the civilian government,
or the clause would be superfluous. Further, if the exceptions
listed were just the more important ones, but the military was to
be treated differently over-all, a more catch-all exception would
have been written as well, much like what was done for excep-
tions to government power through the Ninth Amendment.
There are several clauses and amendments in the Constitution
through which the Framers demonstrate an awareness of the is-
sue of military necessity, and create leeway for it, thereby elimi-
nating the need for special judicial deference beyond that
prescribed. First, Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, reads, "The privi-
lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."35 This exception was described as applicable only
"upon the most urgent and pressing occasions," without which
the privilege "shall be enjoyed ... in the most expeditious and
ample manner."36 This clause most closely mirrors the modern
judicial application of the entire set of constitutional require-
ments to the military (though the clause is less deferential) and
yet it is the only place where the Framers used this language.
This allowance for the military is not based on deference or pri-
oritizing, but on a logical link between the specific right in ques-
tion and the feasibility for the military to protect it in all
circumstances. Clearly, there are times in active war when this
right would be impossible to uphold.
Next, the Third Amendment states that, "No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
36 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 334 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937).
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the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed
by law."'37 This wording explicitly made allowances for situations
of urgency, while still creating a right to be protected at other
times. Again, this exception is based primarily on the extent to
which the right in question directly burdens the military to such a
degree that might, under the certain circumstances to which the
exception solely applies, completely incapacitate it. It does not
suggest any level of deference to the military beyond that neces-
sary to keep it alive during battle.
Finally, the first clause of the Fifth Amendment sets up the
right to a Grand Jury indictment for capital crimes, "except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger."38 Again, this is
an individual right that the Framers specifically made inapplica-
ble to the military, and even then only in cases of urgency.
Again, what the rights enumerated in these clauses all have in
common is that they are particularly tough to apply during times
of extreme danger without crippling the military. The Framers
did not express these concerns, however, with regard to the more
typical personal freedoms, such as those involving speech, reli-
gion, due process, or personal security. This is probably due to
the fact that it is unlikely such liberties would impose a hardship
on the military approaching the magnitude of their necessity to
freedom. If and when these rights impose on the military, the
current civilian constitutional law jurisprudence is more than suf-
ficient to deal with the problem. If the military regulation cannot
survive the standard levels of scrutiny, there is nothing in the
Constitution or its legislative history to suggest that it should be
upheld anyway. Indeed, there is ample evidence to the
contrary.39
Non-application of the inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
maxim could result in an erroneous reading of the spirit of these
clauses. Because the clauses suggest a desire to protect the mili-
tary from the crippling effect of overzealous preservation of indi-
vidual rights, one might infer that the Framers would support
deference to the military, but this would be careless. To suggest
37 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39 "The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another." This doctrine decrees that
where law expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefu-
table inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be
omitted or excluded. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (5th ed. 1979).
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that the clauses addressing military urgency were randomly
placed to demonstrate the Framers' concern for military expedi-
ency, and that that spirit should apply to all interpretation, is to
insult them by turning a blind eye to the care they took in the
selection and placement of each and every word.
The Framers thought about the military's needs, and rather
than creating a catch-all system of deference to those needs, they
attempted to address them individually, as necessary. This was
most likely done, not only to address those military needs, but to
prevent the Court from being forced to grant general deference
to the military, which would be necessary in the absence of the
Framer's efforts to deal with major concerns. Indeed, Madison
himself stated that the federal powers, which are essentially ex-
ceptions to the liberties retained by the people and to the powers
of the states, are "few and defined."4 It follows from this that
the federal government may not reach beyond those which are
written.
Finally, implicit in any set of exceptions is that there is a rule to
which the exceptions exist in the first place. Regardless of the
application of the above maxim, there must be some general ap-
plication that the Framers had in mind when making certain ex-
ceptions for military circumstances. If that general application
were anything but to enforce the Constitution against the mili-
tary, there would be no exceptions at all. Indeed, these excep-
tions are evidence of the rule from which they withdraw.
2. The Second and Third (Military) Amendments
"At heart, the [Second Amendment] reflects a deep anxiety
about a potentially abusive federal military, an anxiety also re-
flected in the Third Amendment."41
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
41 AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 46 (1998); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
749 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (Elbridge Gerry describing the purpose of a militia as
"to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty"); Earl Warren,
The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 185 (1962) (the Second
and Third Amendments were drafted to provide further assurances to a population
"still troubled by the recollection of the conditions that prompted the charge of the
Declaration of Independence that the King had 'effected to render the military in-
dependent and superior to the civil power."'). But see Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun
Laws In Early America: The Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW
& HisT. REv. 567 (1998) (arguing that the impetus for the Second Amendment was
to allow property owners to protect themselves from rebellious indentured servants,
slaves, and Indians).
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The Framers were particularly wary of the threat of tyranny
from military powers. This was the impetus for the Second42 and
Third Amendments.43 By looking at the text itself, and especially
the text the Framers discussed and rejected, one finds meaningful
clues that the entire Bill of Rights applies to the military and that
deference to the military was never expected or intended. The
Framers wished to allow the people to protect themselves from
potential infringements of their rights by a standing army, which
was often described as the "bane of liberty.""
Elbridge Gerry described the Second Amendment as "in-
tended to secure the people against the mal-administration of the
Government; if we could suppose that, in all cases, the rights of
the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards of this
kind would be removed."45 The purpose of the Third Amend-
ment, now putatively a basic privacy right, was more likely to
prevent the military from taking over civilian society.' While
the realities we face today are significantly different from those
that existed over two centuries ago, it would be wrong to forget
the spirit behind this text, which could continue to protect our
liberties in other contexts.
a. The Second Amendment
In the originally proposed clause that would become the Sec-
ond Amendment, there was an additional portion that said, "but
no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear
arms."47 Both the fact that the clause was written, and the fact
that it was removed, lend support to the notion that the Framers
feared military power and did not wish to feed it to the detriment
of individual rights.
The text itself demonstrates this by forbidding the military
42 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
43 "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the con-
sent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
44 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749.
45 Id.
46 See AMAR, supra note 41, at 59-63 (arguing that the Bill of Rights is structural
as well as rights-based, and that the Third Amendment fits together with the Second,
rather than the Fourth, as part of an effort to limit military power in the overall
government scheme).
47 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749.
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from imposing moral hardships on citizens whose religious con-
victions are in the minority. Not only would this clearly apply
even if the military needed such people, but that appears to be its
primary application, as it is unlikely it would be necessary under
any other circumstances. The only time that people are tradi-
tionally compelled to bear arms is during battle. By drafting this
portion of the Amendment, struck out for other reasons as dis-
cussed below, the Framers prioritized religious freedom over mil-
itary necessity. By its obvious application to times of necessity,
the Framers demonstrated an expectation that the Constitution
would apply as strictly to the military as to the civilian
government.
Even more compelling is that the Framers chose not to keep
this language despite their concerns for this religious minority.
There were two reasons for their decision to strike the clause: to
prevent discrimination on the basis of religion, and to leave some
room for the legislature (making it another example of the Fram-
ers' efforts to make allowances for those military needs they
deemed most serious). As Elbridge Gerry stated quite clearly in
the discussion which led to striking out the clause, this was to be
done not only for the sake of the military, but for the people that
it would be prone to mistreating.48 He expressed a fear that its
inclusion could lead to discrimination by, for example, preventing
such 'religiously scrupulous' people from bearing arms if they
wished (like if the need to protect themselves from standing ar-
mies should arise so seriously that they were forced to set aside
their non-violent convictions).49 This discrimination in the appli-
cation of the right, he suggested, would "destroy the constitution
itself."5 The struggle that took place over how to deal with this
issue was a display of powerful convictions regarding the relative
importance in the new government of individual freedom over
military power, which was really only there to protect liberty. In-
deed, much of the colonial population was opposed to having any




51 See Benjamin Franklin, Papers 12:119, THE GAZETEER AND NEW DAILY AD-
VERTISER, May 2, 1765 ("Conceiving themselves the only representatives of
America, they most chearfully acquiesce in his last proposition, and hereby declare
their choice to defend themselves without any military aid. They dread no enemy
but the mother country, and wish to preserve America as an asylum for the wrecks
of liberty." (emphases in the original) (reprinted in THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION
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In ultimately striking out the clause, the Framers of the Bill of
Rights nonetheless emphasized the importance of its spirit. One
of them, Elias Boudinot, argued without opposition on the point
that we should practically never compel religious objectors to
bear arms, primarily because we must make a conscious effort to
depart from the history of oppression during war.52 Still, they de-
liberately left the matter of conscientious objection to the discre-
tion of the legislature with the admonition that it treat the issue
sensitively. Egbert Benson urged: "I have no reason to believe
but the Legislature will always possess humanity enough to in-
dulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but
they ought to be left to their discretion."53
The upshot is that the Legislature should make allowances to
the extent possible, but not be bound when it would create a
hardship. It is key that the Framers thought the only way to
achieve this avoidance of military hardship was by leaving the
clause out of the final text, because it suggests that had it been
left in, the legislature would have been completely bound by it.
They had to strike a rights-granting clause in order to leave room
for legislative/military discretion with regard to situations of ne-
cessity. This is essentially the same arrangement the Supreme
Court has created for those clauses which were not struck, but
rather were ratified. Why were the Framers so concerned that
this clause would excessively tie the Legislature's hands that they
struck it out even though they supported it in spirit (with the
exception of their fears regarding the potential for discrimina-
tion-they discussed both issues in making their decision)? Most
likely, they did so because they did not expect rights-based con-
stitutional clauses to be interpreted deferentially solely according
to military expediency. As it turns out, they could have left the
clause in and gotten the same result.
b. The Third Amendment
If the Framers had expected the level of deference the
Supreme Court now grants the military in determining when it is
appropriate to infringe upon constitutional rights to further its
own interests, the Third Amendment would have been much
215 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE FOUNDER'S
CoNsrrtrrION]).
5 2 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 767.
5 3 Id. at 751.
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shorter and more simple; it would have said "no soldier shall be
quartered in any house without the consent of the owner."54 Re-
flected in the Third Amendment is a greater appreciation for in-
dividual rights than for military convenience. Nonetheless, the
Framers were once again mindful of the risk of binding the mili-
tary at times of great emergency. Thus, they rejected a motion to
apply the amendment to times of war and peace, pointing out the
danger of trapping the military outside in inclement weather dur-
ing a battle." Out of concern for extreme military urgency, they
explicitly left some room for leniency at a "time of war."56 As
discussed in Part II.A.1, supra, this deliberate inclusion suggests
that where such room was necessary in the amendments, it was
created. It also indicates a general view that rights are superior
all the way up to the point of extreme military need.
Suppose for a moment that the motion had passed, and that
the amendment simply stated that "no soldier shall be quartered
in any house without the consent of the owner."57 Is there any
doubt that, under the Court's precedent, allowances would still
be made in cases of military emergency? Indeed, under the pres-
ent deferential standard, the military would not even need to
prove the necessity or demonstrate any lack of alternatives. If
the Court is properly adhering to the Framers' expectations, why
was it so important to them to write the now superfluous excep-
tion for times of war and necessity? The decision to change the
clause supports the argument that the amendments were in-
tended to operate as strictly for the military as they do for the
rest of the government.
B. History: The Framers' Attitudes Toward the Military and
The Implications of Those Attitudes
The Framers were more suspicious of military government
than of government generally. Elbridge Gerry commented that
the most common way for any government to invade the rights
and liberties of its people was by raising an army.58 While draft-
54 Id. at 752 (Sumpter's motion).
55 See id. (comments of Mr. Sherman and Mr. Hartley, and vote defeating Sump-
ter's motion).
56 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
57 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 752.
58 See id. at 749. ("Whenever Governments mean to invade the rights and liber-
ties of the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an
army upon their ruins.").
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ing the Constitution, the Framers expressed concern both about
the military acting against the people, as later happened in Kore-
matsu, and the military government acting against its own
soldiers.5 9 James Madison articulated a goal for the amendments
to "raise barriers against power in all forms and departments of
Government."'  He also specifically urged against forgetting the
tyranny of military power, or the importance of liberty to citi-
zens.6 1 He asserted:
The same causes which have rendered the old world the Thea-
tre of incessant [sic] wars, & have banished liberty from the
face of it, wd. soon produce the same effects here .... The
means of defence agst. foreign danger, have been always the
instruments of tyranny at home.... Throughout all Europe,
the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have en-
slaved the people. 2
Just because the Framers expressed concern for the military's
needs through their various attempts to address them as dis-
cussed in Part II.A, supra, it does not follow that they wished to
give it any more power and autonomy than any other part of the
government. Rather, they recognized the obvious need for a mil-
itary, despite its risks to liberty, and while they hoped to mini-
mize those risks, they did not want to write anything into the
Constitution that would destroy the military entirely, lest the
country return to the mercy of the King. As constitutional
scholar Akhil Amar stated: "[I]n war, with the very survival of
the nation at stake, an army was the lesser of two evils-a nomi-
nally American army might be marginally less threatening to do-
mestic liberty than the enemy's army. '63
Samuel Adams wrote that to allow military leaders different
legal standards is to set them up for tyranny.64 He argued that to
govern the military by different laws will teach it that it is the
59 See, e.g., 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 420-21 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937) (Gouverneur Morris to Moss Kent, Jan. 12, 1815) ("We knew that
when militia were of necessity called out, and nothing but necessity can justify the
call, mercy as well as policy requires, that they be led immediately to attack their
foe.").
60 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436.
61 See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 464-65.
62 Id.
63 AMAR, supra note 41, at 54.
64 Samuel Adams, Writings 1:251, BOSTON GAZETrE, Oct. 17, 1768 (quoting
Locke: "Where the law ends, TYRANNY begins") (reprinted in THE FOUNDER'S CON-
s-TIrON, supra note 51, at 215).
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"LORD[ ] and not the SERVANT[ ] of the people."6 He urged the
people, while it is in their hands to construct a constitution, to be
certain that they did not relinquish too much power to military
forces, which he felt were predisposed to taking advantage:
It behoves the publick then to be aware of the danger, and like
sober men to avail themselves of the remedy of the law, while it
is in their power. It is always safe to ADHERE TO THE LAW, and
to keep every man of every denomination and character
WITHIN ITS BOUNDS--Not to do this would be in the highest
degree IMPRUDENT: Whenever it becomes a question in pru-
dence, whether we shall make use of legal and constitutional
methods to prevent the incroachments of ANY KIND OF
POWER, what will it be but to depart from the straight line, to
give up the LAW and the CONSTITUTION, which is fixed and
stable, and is the collected and long digested sentiment of THE
WHOLE, and to substitute in its room the opinion of individu-
als [referring to military leaders, as was the context of this en-
tire piece], than which nothing can be more uncertain: The
sentiments of men in such a case would in all likelihood be as
various as their sentiments in religion or anything else; and as
there would then be no settled rule for the publick to advert to,
the safety of the people would probably be at an end.66
This fear was common at the time the Constitution was drafted,
as the people had fled from tyranny, both civil and military.
While modern scholars agree that the Framers feared excessive
government powers, the fact that the military was one of the
most dangerous of these powers seems to have disappeared from
the dialogue. This is a complete reversal in the debate which, in
the Eighteenth Century, focused much more heavily on military
tyranny.
Even the Declaration of Independence explicitly criticized
King George for granting deference to the military (through
phony/fixed trials analogous to our current system of great defer-
ence without real scrutiny), and for allowing it to be independent
from and superior to the civil power.67 Further, shortly before
the Framers drafted the amendments, there were numerous
problems with the military disobeying the laws and not being
65 Id. (emphases in original).
66 Id. (emphases in original).
67 See the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 13, 14, 16, & 17 (U.S. 1776)
(Rossiter ed. 1961) ("He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies,
without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the military in-
dependent of and superior to the civil power .... For quartering large bodies of
armed troops among us: For protecting them, by mock trial, from punishment..."
(emphasis added)).
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held accountable. John Jay complained of this circumstance, ar-
guing that the military should be reigned in from its practice of
simply taking things it needed from the people.68 The Framers
were aware of these circumstances, and concerned about them, 69
so it is unlikely that they drafted the amendments with any ex-
pectation of deference to the military. Indeed, part of the impe-
tus for writing a Bill of Rights at all was to address this sort of
behavior.
The modern shift in dealing with military power certainly can-
not be explained away by saying that times have changed, and
the military is now better at walking the line between its urgent
needs and the rights of its soldiers and civilians. One need only
look at the events of the last half-century, from the Japanese in-
ternment camps through the present-day "don't ask, don't tell"
policy to see that this is not the case. Further, the military is now
bigger and stronger than ever, and is kept up at all times, regard-
less of whether the country is at war. Indeed, the circumstances
that were so greatly feared, and which the Framers attempted to
prevent by drafting the amendments to the Constitution, are as
real today as they were when Samuel Adams expressed his
concern.
C. Arguments Based on Governmental Structure: Separation of
Powers and Non-Justiciable Political Questions
1. The Military's Place in the Separated Powers Framework
The military has an almost purely executive function. It is an
entity of action, and not of lawmaking or judicial review. Con-
gress makes the laws under which it must function. It, much like
an administrative agency, makes its own rules for operation. The
federal judiciary is required to keep it in constitutional check.
The military, like some administrative agencies, has its own set of
judges to review controversies arising under its own set of laws
and rules. Certainly, its jurisdiction is broader than that of other
agencies, extending to criminal prosecutions against its own
members, but that jurisdiction does not extend to the last-resort
68 See John Jay, Unpublished Papers 1:461-63, A Freeholder, A Hint to the Legisla-
ture of the State of New York, in THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at
312-13.
69 As evidenced by the conviction that "[t]he military [should] always be
subordinate to the civil power." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 37, at 334.
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interpretation of the Constitution. To the extent that constitu-
tional interpretation is sometimes necessary in any government
decisionmaking process, judicial or otherwise, it is always review-
able by the Supreme Court.7°
The military is a unique society which, to a certain extent, is
only properly understood by its own members. At the same
time, it is a part of the United States, and must therefore function
within our constitutional structure that divides power and re-
sponsibility three ways. While it would indisputably be easier to
allow the military to function more autonomously, governing it-
self according to its own special understanding of its needs, "[t]he
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted ... not to pro-
mote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power."'" Indeed, the various powers were not randomly
handed out, nor were they organized purely by general category,
though this is obviously a factor. Rather, they were carefully ar-
ranged to create a system of checks and balances, simultaneously
authorizing each branch to police the others, and preventing any
branch from either usurping the power of another or delegating
away its own.
The military is no exception to this structure. The Framers
chose to divide control over the military similarly to everything
else. They gave Congress the power to make rules to govern it,72
the states the power to appoint officers,7 3 the President the
power of Commander in Chief,74 and the Court, broadly, the
power of jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution.75
It was at least as important to the Framers to spread out power
over the military as over the civilian government, because they so
greatly feared the dangers of excessively centralized military
control.76
The Court's role in the broader military scheme is to keep it in
70 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
71 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
73 Id. at § 8, cl. 16.
74 Id. at § 2, cl. 1.
75 Id.; see also Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
76 See AMAR, supra note 41, at 54 (arguing that the Framers viewed diffuse con-
trol over the military as an "indispensable bulwark[ ] against any congressional at-
tempt to misuse its power over citizen militiamen"); Warren, supra note 41, at 184
(The Framers' "apprehensions [regarding the danger to liberty of excess military
power] found expression in the diffusion of the war powers granted the Government
by the Constitution.").
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constitutional check. Justice Douglas described this role in Win-
ters v. United States:
Historically, one of the most important roles of civil courts has
been to protect people from military discipline or punishment
who have been placed beyond its reach by the Constitution
and the laws enacted by Congress.... There are those who in
tumultuous times turn their faces the other way saying that it
is not the function of the courts to tell the Armed Forces how
to run a war. Of course that is true. But it is the function of
the courts to make sure, in cases properly coming before them,
that the men and women constituting our Armed Forces are
treated as honored members of society whose rights do not
turn on the charity of a military commander. As stated in Ex
parte Milligan, supra, civil liberty and unfettered military con-
trol are irreconcilably antagonistic. A member of the Armed
Forces is entitled to equal justice under law not as conceived
by the generosity of a commander but as written in the Consti-
tution and engrossed by Congress in our Public Laws. 7
Simply because the Court's role is limited with regard to cases
involving the military, and it must not overstep its bounds by pro-
viding strategic or operational instruction, does not mean that it
has no role at all. Indeed, it has a duty.
In Parisi v. Davidson ,78 the Court was asked to follow princi-
ples of comity with respect to the military tribunal, and not to
review a habeas corpus case until the military tribunal had con-
cluded its court-martial. This it refused to do, though the reason-
ing was based primarily on the difference between the matters
involved in each pending case, such that principles of comity
would not apply even if it were a state court at issue. Justice
Douglas, however, in his concurrence, suggested that the concept
of comity could not apply at all to military tribunals, as they are
essentially analogous to administrative law judges:
Comity is 'a doctrine which teaches that one court should de-
fer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the
courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and al-
ready cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to
pass upon the matter.' But the Pentagon is not yet sovereign.
The military is simply another administrative agency, insofar
as judicial review is concerned. While we have stated in the
past that special deference is due the military decisionmaking
process, this is so neither because of 'comity,' nor the sanctity
77 Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 59-60 (1968) (citations omitted) (granting
a stay from an order to go to Vietnam, pending a resolution of the legality of that
order).
78 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
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of the Executive Branch, but because of a concern for the ef-
fect of judicial intervention on morale and military discipline,
and because of the civilian judiciary's general unfamiliarity
with 'extremely technical provisions of the Uniform Code (of
Military Justice) which have no analogs in civilian
jurisprudence.' 79
This is the logical role that the military should play in our govern-
mental structure. While it is an extremely important and highly
specialized "agency," it is not and cannot be its own judicial
check.
The military's focus is on the execution of war and prepared-
ness to respond to it and to other national and international
emergencies, and not on individual rights. This is probably one
of the reasons why it was not granted the power to determine
which of its actions are constitutionally acceptable. Instead, it is
expected to make a good faith effort to abide by constitutional
principles, which includes submission to the determinations of
our federal judicial branch when there is a controversy. Any lack
of such submission, or any refusal on the part of the judiciary to
enforce constitutional requirements against the military, can re-
sult in a gradual process through which the military becomes
more and more autonomous. Such autonomy is exactly what the
Framers feared most, and sought to avoid by spreading out the
power as they did. The Court has, to a great extent, endorsed
this structural view through its consistent review of habeas
corpus requests by servicemembers. It has stated that the federal
judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over claims for discharge as a
conscientious objector, and that the Court of Military Appeals is
limited to hearing appeals from court-martial convictions.80 Jus-
tice Douglas further explains the role of habeas corpus in keep-
ing the military in check:
A person who appropriately shows that he is exempt from mil-
itary duty may not be punished for failure to submit. The
question is not one of comity between military and civilian
tribunals. One overriding function of habeas corpus is to en-
able the civilian authority to keep the military within bounds.
The Court properly does just that in the opinion announced
79 Id. at 51 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
80 See id. at 44 ("[T]he jurisdiction of the Court of Military Appeals is limited by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice to considering appeals from court-martial con-
victions. That court has been given no 'jurisdiction' to consider a serviceman's claim
for discharge from the military as a conscientious objector." (citations omitted)).
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today.8'
In Parisi, the Court granted the writ to a conscientious objector,
stating that "the writ of habeas corpus has long been recognized
as the appropriate remedy for servicemen who claim to be un-
lawfully retained in the armed forces."'82 In fact, in habeas
corpus cases where plaintiffs assert unlawful induction, they are
not even required to exhaust all administrative remedies before
bringing their cases to federal court.8 3
In sum, the military fits best into our separation of powers
scheme as an executive function, and should not be given judicial
power to interpret the Constitution. As Justice Douglas stated:
The Army has a separate discipline of its own and obviously it
fills a special need. But matters of the mind and spirit, rooted
in the First Amendment, are not in the keeping of the military.
Civil liberty and the military regime have an 'antagonism' that
is 'irreconcilable.' When the military steps over those bounds,
it leaves the area of its expertise and forsakes its domain. The
matter then becomes one for civilian courts to resolve, consis-
tent with the statutes and with the Constitution.84
2. Non-Justiciable Political Questions
In recent decades the Court's deference to the military has
sometimes taken the more palatable form of the non-justiciable
political question.85 In Gilligan, the Court found it "difficult to
conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence," urging that the "complex subtle, and pro-
fessional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and
control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative
and Executive Branches."8 6 The argument is not that deference
is justified by the military's expertise, but that the military's deci-
sions are entirely political ones, which, through executive and
81 Id. at 49 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 39.
83 See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1994).
84 Parisi, 405 U.S. at 54-55 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) for the irreconcilable antagonism between "civil liberty and
the military regime") (emphasis added).
85 See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (appropriateness of National
Guard's training and orders non-justiciable); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83
(1953) (challenge to assignment of duties non-justiciable).
86 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10; see also Orloff, 345 U.S. at 94 ("Orderly government
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army
matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.").
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legislative control, are accountable to the electorate. This doc-
trine most certainly applies to the daily decisions involving mili-
tary operation, strategy, and for the most part, policy. These are
rightfully a part of the political process. It does not follow, how-
ever, that the doctrine may be applied to military decisions that
violate individual constitutional rights. The doctrine does not
generally apply that way in the civilian context, and there is no
reason why it should in the military context.
These political question holdings do not, however, entail any'
judicial restraint from protecting constitutional rights from gov-
ernment infringement, so the military still must not be excepted.
The Court itself has clearly limited the doctrine of political ques-
tion in this way as well, so I do not argue against its case-law on
this point; my only point is that scholarly discussion of this issue
must observe the same limitation. The Court in Gilligan made
this point clear:
In concluding that no justiciable controversy is presented, it
should be clear that we neither hold nor imply that the con-
duct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or
that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for
violations of law for specific unlawful conduct by military per-
sonnel, whether by way of damages or injunctive relief. We
hold only that no such questions are presented in this case.
8 7
In that case, the plaintiffs were asking the district court to "estab-
lish standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and
kind of orders to control the actions of the National Guard."88
In addition, the plaintiffs wanted continued judicial supervision
of the training and operations of the Guard to ensure compliance
with the court-approved procedures.89 The separation of powers
problem inherent in such a request is clear, even to those who
advocate the strictest judicial review of the military that the Con-
stitution will allow.
In Orloff, the Court was willing to go so far as to hold that the
military was required to place professional inductees in positions
which utilize their professional skills, but not so far as to take
control over specific duty orders within that field.9 ° In other
87 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11-12.
8 8 Id. at 6.
89 See id. ("Respondents contend that thereafter the District Court must assume
and exercise a continuing judicial surveillance over the Guard to assure compliance
with whatever training and operations procedures may be approved by that court.").
90 Orloff, 345 U.S. at 88 ("We agree that the statute should be interpreted to obli-
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words, the issue of whether the rationale behind induction was
lawful is justiciable, but whether each and every professional ser-
vicemember is entitled to perform those duties for which he or
she is best educated is not.
3. The Greater Separation of Powers Problem Suggests Less
Deference to Military Decisions
The separation of powers doctrine, as discussed earlier, has as
its primary purpose and function the prevention of power con-
centration. It is not enough to prevent one branch from usurping
the power of another; it is also important to forbid delegation of
the power and duty invested in any branch. While all three
branches are bound by an oath to support the Constitution, the
judicial duty to interpret the Constitution is vested in the judici-
ary, and it may not shirk that duty or allow others to share it.
The military is not a part of the judicial branch, and has no au-
thority to engage in constitutional judicial review. When the
Supreme Court asserts as its primary justification for holding a
military act constitutional that the military itself has already cal-
culated its action to be sufficiently necessary to survive constitu-
tional inquiry, it delegates its most basic constitutional duty to
the military. This is especially egregious when the military act
challenged would, absent narrow tailoring to a compelling gov-
ernment interest in the civilian context, be deemed an unconsti-
tutional infringement on someone's liberty.
Justice Brennan persuasively described this problem in his dis-
sent in Goldman v. Weinberger:
Today the Court eschews its constitutionally mandated role. It
adopts for review of military decisions affecting First Amend-
ment rights a subrational-basis standard - absolute, uncritical
"deference to the professional judgment of military authori-
ties." If a branch of the military declares one of its rules suffi-
ciently important to outweigh a service person's constitutional
rights, it seems that the Court will accept that conclusion, no
matter how absurd or unsupported it may be.91
The source of Brennan's frustration with the majority was not his
disagreement with the result, but the fact that the process which
gate the Army to classify specially inducted professional personnel for duty within
the categories which rendered them liable to induction. It is not conceded, however,
that particular duty orders within the general field are subject to judicial review by
habeas corpus.").
91 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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led to that result was not constitutionally proper. There is more
than mere deference in play here. This case in particular is an
example of one that, due to the years that Dr. Goldman wore his
yarmulke without incident, and to the over-inclusiveness of the
regulation, would probably have failed even an intermediate
level of constitutional scrutiny.
This is not to suggest that every case in which the Court has
explicitly deferred to the military's judgment as to the constitu-
tionality of its actions would have failed standard constitutional
analysis. There will certainly be circumstances, perhaps with
even greater frequency than in the civilian government, when the
military's needs are so great, and alternative options so lacking,
that it must violate an individual's rights and the Court must al-
low it to do so. The problem lies in the frequent, if not consis-
tent, lack of any constitutional analysis at all. By stating that the
relevant analysis has been done at the military level, the Court is
not only shirking its constitutional duty to police the other
branches, it is delegating its interpretive function to them.
III
SOME SUGGESTIONS
Because necessity is one of the justifications for the judicial
behavior criticized, it is fair to ask what alternative approaches
would make it possible to strike a proper balance between indi-
vidual rights and military imperatives. Not only does the Court
often complain of its inability to determine the military's needs
without simply accepting the military's own assertions, but even
when it offers other justifications for its deference, at the core the
problem is nearly always the Court's lack of expertise. This is a
difficult problem, but that does not excuse the legal community
from its problem-solving responsibility. Rather than attempting
creative arrangements to aid in the proper constitutional analysis
of military cases, the Court has thrown up its hands and handed
over its jurisdiction.
When criticizing the "'special expertise' argument [which] is
often employed by the defenders of the military court system," 92
Justice Douglas pointed out that "civilian courts must deal with
equally arcane matters in such areas as patent, admiralty, tax, an-
92 Parisi, 405 U.S. 34, 52 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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titrust, and bankruptcy law, on a daily basis."93 It is worthwhile,
then, to take a moment to consider how this is achieved. In cases
such as Justice Douglas describes, the parties generally call disin-
terested third-party experts to testify to relevant understandings
of the field, as well as to the reasonability, within that field, of a
particular act. The attorneys will take the time to locate such
witnesses for cases dealing with areas in which precedent has
taught them that this is important to do. This better enables the
courts to fulfill their responsibility to engage in the legal analysis
that those field experts cannot do on their own. The judicial
holdings of such cases are thus a result of the combined wisdom
of the experts and the judges. For this reason alone, the impor-
tance of ensuring that the experts are disinterested should be
evident.
Not only is the military like its own specialized field, but it is
also somewhat more removed from society than are other spe-
cialized fields. For this reason, the need for such disinterested
experts in the military field is both exceptionally great and more
difficult to fulfill. Most experts on the military are either in the
military, so clearly not disinterested, or were formerly in the mili-
tary, which increases the likelihood of bias. This is not to say that
all people in the military, or even all those who are or were of-
ficers in the military, are the same, or are hostile to upholding
constitutional rights. The argument against using experts with di-
rect ties to the military leaves plenty of room for diversity of
thought, politics, and opinion among military personnel. When
the courts allow expert testimony in other fields, they do not se-
lect those that either work or have worked at a company that is
one of the litigants in the case. This is the most basic of precau-
tions we take in the selection of disinterested experts.94
93 Id. at 53.
94 An excellent example of military bias can be demonstrated through a compari-
son between two reports Secretary of Defense Les Aspin commissioned to aid him
in determining the appropriate policy to apply to gays in the military. He asked
both the RAND Corporation, a private nonprofit research institute, and a Military
Working Group (MWG) to do a study on the effects of allowing homosexuals to
serve in the military. The two reports reached quite different conclusions. The
RAND Report, based on the research of numerous sociologists, anthropologists,
psychologists, historians, doctors, economists, and attorneys, determined that gay
men and lesbians could openly serve in the military without damaging unit cohesion,
so long as the message behind that policy is "clear and ... consistently communi-
cated from the top." The MWG Report, on the other hand, concluded that homo-
sexuality in the military could only be tolerated if kept a secret. This report, of
course, is the one Aspin used in the DOD policy. For further discussion of the dif-
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Diversity of military personnel notwithstanding, the risk of
bias is probably at least slightly higher with members and former
members of the military than it is with former corporate employ-
ees. This is precisely because of the specialized military society
to which the Court so often refers. The very system of subordi-
nation that the Court does not wish to tamper with has a psycho-
logical impact on those who participate in it, either as
commander or as subordinate. The likelihood of bias is quite
great, though it might as easily be a bias against the military as
one in its favor.9 5 Still, either bias should disqualify an individual
from testifying as an expert in a case where the military is one of
the parties. This basic common sense is the norm in nonmilitary
cases, and yet time and again the Court (exclusively) allows mili-
tary leaders to provide it with all of the evidence of military ne-
cessity through their own assessments of the demands of the
military's "special society."
The upshot is that we need experts on military culture, strat-
egy, daily operation, regulation, etc. who are not, and never have
been, members of the armed forces themselves. How to arrange
for the existence of such experts is not the focus here, and there
are probably many avenues. The important thing is that we ac-
knowledge the need for disinterested military experts and re-
spond to it creatively. The nature of the situation suggests that
both Congress and the Court would need to support such an ef-
fort in order for it to succeed.
Essentially, it would significantly aid the process of constitu-
tional inquiry into military behavior to have people who are
trained in the functions of the military be available on an on-call
basis, but not necessarily full-time. One possible way of achiev-
ing this could be through the creation of a new government fel-
lowship through which such training would be provided to a
select group of civilians. In addition to a rigorous selection pro-
cess controlled by a diverse panel, applicants would be subject to
a security background check prior to admission. Upon the com-
pletion of the program, much of which would include immersion
in (but not subjection to) the military environment, fellows
ferences between these reports, and their relation to Aspin's policymaking, see Janet
E. Halley, The Status/Conduct Distinction in the 1993 Revisions to Military Anti-Gay
Policy: A Legal Archaeology, 3 GLQ 159, 227-30, n.28 & 34 (1996). See also JANET
E. HALLEY, A GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999).
95 An environment as rigorous and subordinating as that of the military surely
must return more than a few disgruntled soldiers from its service.
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would return to their academic institutions or other places of em-
ployment. The alumni of this program would agree to be, for a
certain number of years, the pool of experts available to testify
honestly and without bias in cases where the military is brought
before the civilian judiciary. For this purpose they would be
granted security clearance and have access to all information rel-
evant to the particular controversy.
Another option would be to create a small military oversight
agency. While this would be government, it would still be civil-
ian, and therefore in tune with the Framers' mandate that the
military "always be subordinate to the civil power."96 The
agency would be expert on the military's needs, and could even
take over some of the administrative complaint procedures that
are presently conducted within the military. Much like the
EEOC with regard to employment discrimination, the agency
would not possess the judicial power, but the results of its factual
investigations would be available to federal courts.
Regardless of what is ultimately done about the Court's infor-
mational problems in dealing with military cases, something must
be done. Looking the other way while the military gains more
strength and autonomous power every year, 97 and with every
new Supreme Court opinion, is not an acceptable option.
IV
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE: DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL
On July 19, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced
the new Department of Defense policy regarding gays in the mil-
96 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 36, at 334.
97 See Warren, supra note 41, at 187-88:
A few months after Washington's first inauguration, our army numbered a
mere 672 of the 840 authorized by Congress. Today, in dramatic contrast,
the situation is this: Our armed forces number two and a half million; every
resident male is a potential member of the peacetime armed forces; such
service may occupy a minimum of four per cent of the adult life of the
average American male reaching draft age; reserve obligations extend over
ten per cent of such a person's life; and veterans are numbered in excess of
twenty-two and a half million. When the authority of the military has such
a sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of
treating the military establishment as an enclave beyond the reach of the
civilian courts almost inevitably is drawn into question.
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itary.98 This policy, which has become popularly known as the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy, suggests that a lesbian/gay/bisexual
person may serve in the military, so long as they are not discov-
ered. It purports to shift the ban on homosexuality in the mili-
tary from one against status to one against conduct, in an effort
to protect it from constitutional challenge.99 In practice, how-
ever, status is far more often the source of trouble for gay and
lesbian servicemembers than any actual act."° Aspin's memo-
randum even defines "homosexual conduct" as "a homosexual
act, a statement by the servicemember that demonstrates a pro-
pensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual
marriage or attempted marriage." 101 The term "propensity"
seems to refer more closely to one's status than to conduct.
For a number of reasons, the "don't ask, don't tell" policy is
the perfect place for the Supreme Court to begin to treat the
military with less deference. First, it is an example of a situation
where policy was knowingly made constitutionally weak in reli-
ance on the Court's usual deference. Second, it is a case in which
there is merit to the assertions of constitutional violation. Third,
the lower courts have specifically stated that they are bound by
the Court's precedent of deference to the military in deciding this
case, so there is opportunity to correct the problem. Finally,
there is already civilian academic research and data on the effect
of having homosexual individuals present in the military, so the
fact that the suggestions made in Part III have not been imple-
mented will pose less of a burden than in other contexts.
A. Other Branches' Reliance On Expected Deference Affects
Decision-Making
The "don't ask, don't tell" policy is a good example of what
98 See Memorandum of Department of Defense, Re: Policy on Homosexual Con-
duct in the Armed Forces (July, 1993) [hereinafter DOD MEMO].
99 For a discussion of the distinction between status and conduct in this policy, see
generally Halley, supra note 94.
100 See Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 919, 927 (1994):
[T]he new policy.., punishes status and speech while permitting conduct
to be excused, if the military so desires, upon exercising its discretion. A
service member who simply announces that he or she is gay, lesbian or
bisexual is much more likely to be discharged than someone who has actu-
ally engaged in homosexual conduct, as long as the conduct is not publicly
acknowledged.
101 DOD MEMO, supra note 98 (emphasis added).
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can result from the Court's pattern of deference, beyond the re-
suits of any particular case it decides by according deference, or
even the precedential value of that holding. Just as Justice Jack-
son feared at the time Korematsu was decided, the principle of
deference can be a "loaded weapon" for military authorities to
use in making decisions. °2 Attorney General Janet Reno pre-
pared a memorandum for the President in order to instruct him
as to the likelihood that Aspin's new policy would survive a con-
stitutional challenge. The purpose of the memo was to aid the
President in making a decision regarding whether to accept the
policy, as such determinations are based in part on whether a
challenge can be defeated. The memorandum pointed to the his-
tory of deference as evidence that the policy would survive, thus
discouraging any effort to improve upon it:
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the courts must
review decisions by the President and by military commanders
deferentially, taking into account the separate nature and spe-
cial needs of military society. As a consequence, it is possible
to justify in the military setting constraints on individual lib-
erty and choice that might be invalid in civilian society. Be-
cause of the extraordinary deference paid by the courts to
military service, we are confident that the new policy proposed
by the Secretary of Defense will be upheld against constitu-
tional challenge.' °3
This reliance on expected deference, resulting in a consciously
reduced effort to protect the constitutional rights of ser-
vicemembers, is the most compelling reason for a change in judi-
cial policy in this regard. If members of the other two branches
of government could always be relied upon to wholeheartedly
abide by their oaths to be bound by the Constitution, there
would be no need for a third branch to keep them in check.
B. The Constitutional Challenge to the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" Policy Has Merit
If it were litigated in a civilian context, the "don't ask, don't
tell" policy would probably be held unconstitutional for a variety
of reasons. First, it could be held to violate due process require-
ments by punishing status. Second, it could be held to violate the
First Amendment by punishing speech rather than conduct.
lo2 See supra text accompanying note 8.
103 Memorandum of the Office of the Attorney General, Re: Defensibility of the
New Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (July, 1993).
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Finally, it could be held to violate equal protection by treating
homosexuals differently under the law than heterosexuals.
Although homosexuals are neither a suspect class entitled to
strict scrutiny, nor a quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate
scrutiny, they are still a definable class and are thus entitled to at
least rational basis scrutiny, which still places a burden on the
government that it may not be able to meet here.
The "propensity" clause of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy
may violate the Due Process requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Robinson v. California,"°4 a case involving the
criminalization of narcotics addiction, the Supreme Court held
that punishing people because of their status violates due pro-
cess. 105 Under the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, no evidence of
conduct is required in order to discharge a servicemember for
being gay. The conduct is inferred from the status, and the bur-
den is on the servicemember to prove the absence of that con-
duct. Because of the difficulties inherent in trying to prove a
negative, the policy essentially punishes status.
The "don't tell" requirement is a potential violation of the
First Amendment. "When any law restricts speech, even for a
purpose that has nothing to do with the suppression of communi-
cation (for instance, to reduce noise, to regulate election cam-
paigns, or to prevent littering) [courts] insist that it meet the high,
First Amendment standard of justification."' 6 This is the case
regardless of how controversial' 7 or offensive 10 8 that speech may
be deemed. The restriction on speech that the "don't ask, don't
tell" policy entails needs to be analyzed to determine its neces-
sity. Moreover, the policy does not merely proscribe speech that
takes place in the employment context, but applies anywhere and
with anyone. If it is discovered that a servicemember told a
friend or relative that he or she was gay, the policy applies. Fi-
nally, the speech proscription is content-based because not eve-
ryone who states their sexual orientation risks punishment-only
104 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
105 See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (homeless-
ness may not be criminalized).
106 Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948) (noise reduction); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (campaign regulation); and Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147, 162-63 (1939) (litter prevention)).
107 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
108 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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those who state a particular one. Content-based speech restric-
tions are generally forbidden by the First Amendment. 1°9
Finally, because the policy discriminates against an entire class
of people, it could be held to violate the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has set up
three standards of review for cases in which the government has
disadvantaged a particular class of persons: where the classifica-
tion is based on race or national origin, the courts are to apply a
"strict scrutiny" standard of review, which requires the govern-
ment to show that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling interest; where the classification is based on gender
or age, the courts are to apply "intermediate scrutiny," which re-
quires that the classification be substantially related to an impor-
tant government interest; and in most other cases, courts apply a
"rational basis" standard, under which the government need only
demonstrate a rational relationship between the classification
and a permissible government interest.110 Despite the difference
in these methods, there is one common thread: the burden is on
the government to meet the standard, however low it might be.
If this burden were placed on the military with regard to its dis-
crimination against gay and lesbian servicemembers, it may have
trouble meeting even the rational basis standard, especially in
light of the RAND study, if consulted.
The Court's own ruling in Romer v. Evans"' provides the
strongest support for an equal protection challenge to the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy. In that case, the Court held unconstitu-
tional an amendment to the Colorado constitution that prohib-
ited laws designed to prevent discrimination against homosexual
persons, calling it "a classification of persons undertaken for its
own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not per-
mit."' 1 2 The Court held that the amendment lacked a rational
relationship to a legitimate interest because it was "at once too
narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and
then denies them protection across the board.""' 3 This is pre-
cisely what the "don't ask, don't tell" policy does: it identifies
109 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that limita-
tions on speech, even where justifiable if made general, may not be based on the
content of that speech).
1 10 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-46 (1985).
111 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
112 Id. at 635.
113 Id. at 633.
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persons by the very same trait, and then denies all of them,
across the board, the opportunity to serve in the military openly.
Not only is Romer somewhat analogous to a "don't ask, don't
tell" challenge, but at a minimum it stands for the proposition
that even a rational basis inquiry into legislation that targets gays
and lesbians will involve an expectation of some degree of nar-
row tailoring." 4 Although such an inquiry will not require the
legislation to be as narrowly tailored as possible, if it is suffi-
ciently overbroad, it will fail to appear rationally related." 5 Ab-
sent the complete deference granted military regulations, it is
reasonable to believe that the Court might find that banning
openly gay individuals entirely from service is too excessively
broad to bear a clear relationship to the need for unit cohesion.
C. Lower Courts Have Used the Mandated Deference to the
Military as the Primary Justification for Upholding
the Policy
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of
this policy, though it has been challenged in the lower courts and
is on its way up for review. The Able v. United States1 6 case
presents the best example of why this situation may be an excel-
lent opportunity for the Court to begin a new era of reduced mil-
itary deference. In that case, which upheld the constitutionality
of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, the central issue was defer-
ence to the military, and whether, in striking down the policy, the
district court had granted it properly under Supreme Court pre-
cedent. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York held that the policy violated the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 117 In its appeal to the Second Circuit,
"[tihe government argue[d] that the district court failed to accord
the judgments of Congress and the military the proper deference
in deciding the eligibility requirements for military service and
114 See id. at 632-33 (pointing out that cases in which the Court had found a law to
advance a legitimate government interest dealt with laws "narrow enough in scope"
to "ascertain some relation between the classification and the purpose it served.").
115 See id. at 635 ("The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.").
116 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
117 See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Able v. United
States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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that, under the correct standard, [the policy] is constitutional. 118
The Second Circuit agreed. After conceding that the policy
would likely fail a civilian-level analysis, the court stated that the
long line of Supreme Court precedent mandating deference to
the military required it to reverse the holding below." 9 Indeed,
the court went so far as to say that, under Supreme Court prece-
dent, courts are not to scrutinize the underlying purposes behind
military actions, though they would do so even in cases requiring
only "rational basis review" arising in a civilian context.120 Be-
cause this level of deference is so extreme, it presents a good
opportunity for the Court to scale back its degree in an opinion
that reverses this holding.
D. Civilian-Gathered Data Are Already Available
There is conflicting evidence regarding the effect allowing gays
to openly serve in the military would have on unit cohesion and
morale. 12 1 Therefore, this issue is especially convenient for the
Court to use to begin a new era of analyzing the constitutionality
of military policies on a factual basis. There are already civilian
data suggesting that the current policy is unnecessary, so the
Court could remand for analysis and consideration of all the
data. Then, if Congress were to implement something along the
lines of what I described in Part 111,122 the courts would be in a
better position in the future to base their rulings in military cases
on facts rather than blind deference.
CONCLUSION
More than two centuries after the Framers presented the coun-
try with their vision of limited and diffuse powers, it is drifting in
the area of military regulation. It is not too late, however, to
reconsider what the Framers intended with regard to military
power, and to act accordingly. Military leaders are all too aware
of the history of Supreme Court deference to their decisions, and
have not always chosen the best response to that grant of consti-
tutional authority. Instead of treating it as a grave responsibility,
118 Able, 155 F.3d at 630.
119 See id. at 633-36.
120 See id. at 634.
121 See comparison of RAND and MWG reports on this matter, supra note 94.
122 Members of all three branches of government have a duty to support the Con-
stitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, so Congress should endeavor to aid the Court in
its present constitutional dilemma with the military through such implementation.
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they have taken advantage of it by cutting corners when it comes
to individual rights. The Framers did not contemplate that the
military would have this opportunity in the first place, and it is
time for the Court to take back the role of determining whether a
particular military action violates the Constitution. Although it
is key to strike a balance between our national security on the
one hand, and the rights asserted by an individual on the other,
we must take care to remember that on the latter side of that
balance, the integrity of our system of liberties weighs in along
with that individual.
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